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Resistance to U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America:
Hugo Chávez and Venezuela
Abstract
Recent years have seen increasing opposition
to U.S. political and economic influence in
Latin America. Venezuela is a key player in
the South American economy. This project
researches the country’s history from the
1950s to the present and the role of the
U.S. in its formation. Through political
economy, this study asks if recent political
changes are due to the effects of U.S. policies
in Venezuela. The research examines
the relationship between the two nations
and the development models proposed
by the Chávez government. The paper
considers alternative models of economic
development, independent from U.S.
political hegemony.
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Introduction
On April 11, 2002, a group of
senior military officers stormed the
presidential palace in Caracas, the
capital of Venezuela. They ousted the
leftist president, Hugo Chávez, and
replaced him with the more conservative
Pedro Carmona. The coup had the
support of the business community,
the upper classes, the mass media, and
tacit support from the U.S.; however,
the de-facto government was short
lived (Cooper, 2002; Hellinger, 2003;
García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti, 2005).
Thousands of the nation’s poor filled
the streets demanding that Chávez be
restored to office while, in a surprising
move, branches of the Venezuelan
military acted to support rather than
suppress the movement. After two
days of massive protests, Carmona
stepped down and Chávez returned
to power. Scholars Steve Ellner and
Daniel Hellinger (2003) claim that
this scenario “has no equivalent in
Latin American history” (p. ix). No
equivalent in Latin American history?
Such a strong assertion, as well as the
media controversy over Chávez and
his “Bolivarian Revolution,” are what
spur research on this topic. What has
happened in Venezuela to create such
controversy, and what does it mean?
The goals of this project are two-fold.
The first is to investigate recent changes
in Venezuelan society since the election
of Hugo Chávez, putting them in a
historical context that reveals their root
causes. This enables one to see beyond
the rhetoric and romanticism of street
protests and coups, making sense of
social and economic changes that may
appear at a glance to be chaotic. The
second goal is to develop a theoretical
interpretation of these national changes
that is grounded in a global framework.
Globalization has been changing the
way people understand the concepts
of community and economy; therefore
focusing on the national level alone is
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insufficient. Careful attention has been
paid here to the colonial history of
Latin American countries – this history
continues to shape development and
politics of power in the region, and it is
my belief that present-day inequalities
stem from its legacy. Upon looking at
the case of Venezuela, I argue that the
revolutionary program proposed by
Chávez is not so shocking given the
history and structure of Venezuela’s
political-economic system. I also submit
that, despite its shortcomings, the
program offers policy changes that are
necessary for the development of regional
sovereignty for South America and for
a sustainable system that is inclusive of
previously marginalized Venezuelans. The
“revolution” that Chávez brought with
his presidency may well be a middleroad model that defies both traditional
capitalist and state-socialist models.
History
Traditional democracy: The Punto Fijo system
For decades, Venezuela was considered
by many to be an “exceptional” nation,
both because of its prosperous economy
and because of its governmental system
similar to that of the United States
(Coronil, 2000; Ellner, 2003; Kelly &
Romero, 2002). The political structure

was founded in 1958 with the Pact of
Punto Fijo, an agreement that established
an electoral democratic system after
years of dictatorship and coups. The
new arrangement was designed to bring
together democracy, oil nationalism,
and economic development in a project
that cast the state as distributor of oil
rent money (Coronil, 2000; Hellinger,
2003). In the electoral system, two
dominant parties shared power – the
social democratic Acción Democratica
(AD) and Christian democratic Comité
de Organización Política Electoral
Independiente (COPEI). The two parties
alternated in power uninterrupted for
nearly four decades.
According to historian-anthropologist
Fernando Coronil (1997), Venezuelan
democracy was distinctive because
of its fusion of resource wealth with
political power. With this combination,
he says, citizens could expect to both
participate in the political system and
benefit from the natural wealth of the
country’s resources. Furthermore, he
describes how the nation could be
thought of as having two parts: a “social
body” made of its people and political
organization, and a “natural body” made
of its physical resources. This split was
significant because it aligned political

Figure 1. International crude oil prices from 1978 to 2005 (Source: Oil Energy)
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power with nature, rather than with
the people: “the nation’s social body
became more marked as the passive
beneficiary of its natural body, seen
now as the main source of the nation’s
powers” (Coronil, 1997, p. 168). It is
in this context that one can understand
Venezuela’s economic system of statism.
Such systems, internally-focused and
less open to foreign investment, were
common from the 1930s to 1960s in
Latin America and the United States.
Statist philosophy maintains that the
state should create the conditions for
industrial development and strategic
strength (Kelly & Romero, 2002). This
was the goal of the Pact of Punto Fijo,
which organized the state to be the
manager of its natural resource wealth.
The close relationship between the
state and industry in this model meant
that the government derived most of
its revenue from the oil industry. Oil
drilling had begun in 1914, expanded
quickly throughout the 1950s, and
when Venezuela nationalized its oil
industry in 1976, it represented the
culmination of the Punto Fijo project
(Hellinger, 2003). After the oil embargo
by the Arab states of OPEC, global
oil prices skyrocketed, making for
windfall revenues to oil-exporting
nations world-wide. (See Figure 1.)
Indeed, Venezuela received more money
during this boom than all of Europe
did under the Marshall Plan (Coronil,
1997). The surge in income allowed
the Venezuelan government to further
its statist agenda. It increased spending
on social programs and infrastructure
projects, and from the oil industry grew
a prosperous middle class.
A sharp decline in oil prices after the
1970s began to erode the middle class
and forced the government to borrow
heavily to maintain its social spending.
This caused Venezuela (and numerous
other Latin American export-based
economies) to accumulate massive debts,
the effects of which are still felt today.
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It is critical to understand how the
bond between governmental institutions
and oil money shapes the economic
and social progress of the country.
Statism and Import Substitution
Industrialization were common in other
Latin American countries as well, but
the high revenues brought in by oil (as
opposed to other primary-good exports)
were what had helped to bolster
Venezuela’s exceptional image.
The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist
model: Long-term causes
The exceptionality was not an inherent
national characteristic, however, and in
the last decade Venezuelans watched
as their system of 40 years came apart
at the seams. There are both long-term
and immediate reasons for the decline,
both of which must be acknowledged
to understand the current situation.
The long-term economic and political
factors leading to the demise of
puntofijismo have to do with the efficacy
and legitimacy of the system. Scholars
disagree over which factors were most
important, though there is a general
consensus that the system was in decay.
Some believe that the main cause was
a matter of economic mismanagement.
Terry Karl (as cited in Hellinger,
2001; as cited in Ellner, 2003) blames
Venezuela’s economic failure on the
reliance on oil to sustain the economy.
She argues that oil-exporting nations
suffer a phenomenon known as the
“Dutch Disease,” a problem that occurs
when booms overvalue currency and
weaken other sectors in a domestic
market. A single-export based economy
is also vulnerable to fluctuations in
market prices, which can be disastrous
when they fall.
As Kelly and Romero (2002) point
out, high prices can also be disastrous.
High revenues can lead to overconfidence (“an atmosphere of easy
money”) and corruption (Kelly &
Romero, p. 149). The boom’s impact
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in Venezuela was to create a society
in which the population expected
the state to distribute the wealth
of its export, despite the lack of
productivity and organization on the
part of the population (Parenti, 2005;
Kelly & Romero). Ever since 1936,
the government has touted its goal of
“sowing the oil,” the phrase for using
the nation’s oil wealth to establish
productive enterprises in other sectors.
The country’s failure to “sow the
oil” does not surprise Coronil (1997),
however, who argues that Dutch Disease
is a misnomer. He says that it should
be renamed the “Third World” or “Neocolonial Disease,” pointing out that
it is “an epidemic in the monocrop
economies of the third world” that
seldom afflicts nations of first-world
status (Coronil, 1997, p. 7). He also
argues that the Dutch Disease does
not give a satisfactory explanation of
the decline of the economy because
the real causes are beyond mere
mismanagement. The economic and
social downturn that took place after
the boom of the 70s had to do with
over-reliance on oil, but the overall
decline was the result of structural and
cultural deficiencies in the country. The
Punto Fijo government was not really
a democratic revolution that eliminated
the oligarchs of the past, as the national
mythology led people to believe. Rather,
Coronil (1997, 2000) claims, it was a
compromise on the part of the elite to
transfer political power to the electorate
while maintaining the privileges of
wealth and influence.
Just as oil wealth had allowed the
concentration of political power in
the figure of the president during
[previous military dictatorships],
it made it possible for the ruling
democratic parties to monopolize
political and economic power and
to exert extraordinary influence
over society. (Coronil, 2000, p. 35)

If the Punto Fijo system is analyzed
in this light, the failure of Venezuela to
create a sustainable economy did not
result only from mismanagement by
party leaders, but also from the structure
of the political-economic system itself. It
is well-documented that the system was
marred by corruption, and the struggle
to be rid of it continues (Maya, 2003;
Roberts, 2003; Gott 2001; Coronil,
1997; Munckton, 2005; Parenti, 2005).
Corruption was visible when Carlos
Andres Pérez, president for the first
time during the late-seventies oil boom,
suffered two separate coup attempts
during his second term in 1992. The
coups failed, but Pérez was impeached
on counts of corruption the following
year. In the 1993 presidential elections,
the abstention rate was 39%, the
highest in Venezuelan history (Buxton,
2003). These events, and others to
follow, served to reinforce a widespread
discontent with the party system, which
had caused them in the first place
(Coronil, 2000).
Partly as a result of the corruption,
the benefits of oil money were not
enjoyed equally by all Venezuelans.
Political power in the democracy was
strictly centralized in the two parties
and was distributed on the basis of
patron-client relationships. Unlike the
ideology that cast each citizen as part
land-owner (Coronil, 2000), not all of
the population shared in the prosperity
of oil sales. The biggest beneficiaries of
national wealth were those who were
best positioned to take advantage of
political institutions in the patronage
system – these tend to be urban
dwellers of upper-class status and
White/European ethnic origins. Political
access has been especially difficult for
Indigenous and Black Venezuelans,
minorities who were not protected by
the constitution prior to 1999 (Becker,
2004). Even in 2000, the top 10 percent
of the population received half of the
national income (Gott, 2001).

83

Acknowledging the sources of
the economic decline, it must be
emphasized that the erosion of living
standards began far in advance of the
tumultuous events of the 1990s. After
international oil prices plummeted in
the 1980s, Venezuela had borrowed
heavily to maintain its funding for
social programs and services. Loans did
not secure social spending, however.
During the neoliberal economic
adjustments of the late 1980s, countries
aimed to decentralize the government
and economy through financial
deregulation and privatization of state
enterprises. However, these measures
only exacerbated poor conditions. In
Venezuela, social spending decreased
from 8 percent of GDP to 4.3 percent
(Roberts, 2003), and with the decreased
national income came impoverishment
and a widening income gap. Julia
Buxton (2003) reports that poverty grew
from 36% to 66% from the mid 80s to
mid 90s, shooting from 43.9% to 66.5%
in the year between 1988 and 1989. At
the height of political crisis in the mid
1990s, the general poverty rate was at
86% (Buxton). The middle class had
shrunk and civil society increasingly
lacked organization. This was especially
true of organized labor; as the economy
grew less formal, the traditional, more
productive enterprises of industry and
agriculture waned while service jobs,
short-term and informal employment
had become prominent. These trends
show that the economic decline came in
a number of ways and occurred over an
extended period of time.
The demise of Punto Fijo and the statist
model: Immediate causes
Immediate factors signaled the fall of the
traditional system as well. The coups
of 1992 and impeachment of Carlos
Andres Pérez were not the only visible
evidence of the decline; other events
illustrated the increasing social unrest
and disillusionment. In 1989, Pérez
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had been elected for another term by
Venezuelans who opposed free-market
or neoliberal reforms (Buxton, 2003;
Márquez, 2003). Contrary to his social
democratic platform, Pérez shocked
the nation by embracing the policies he
had decried in the 1970s. In what has
been dubbed “The Great U-Turn,” he
announced on February 16 that he had
already made an agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
implement liberalization measures.
Shortly after his announcement the
Bolivar was deregulated and the price
of petroleum shot up by 100%. This
placed an immediate burden on bus
drivers living in the crowded shanty
towns around Caracas. To cover costs,
they doubled bus fares, and on February
27, commuters rioted in response,
sending a wave of protests through the
countryside in a matter of days. It took
five days to quell the revolt, known as
the Caracazo, and this single event has
had a lasting impact on Venezuelan
society. Pérez later explained that his
decision was due to the desperate need
for foreign investment. Acknowledging
that the decision was unpopular, he said
that Venezuelans “…must understand
that these are unavoidable. There was
no other way out” (Gott, 2001, p. 51).
The riots were the country’s first mass
expression of class-based unrest since
the 1930s and marked the end of
passivity on the part of the public.
Like the Caracazo, the failed coups
of 1992 were also turning points. The
first attempt was led by Hugo Chávez
Frías, a young officer who had been
involved in revolutionary organizing
within the military academy. When he
and the coup supporters were arrested
for treason, he made a one-minute
televised statement in which he told his
comrades to put down their arms and
took responsibility for the failure. He
declared to the public that por ahora
(for the time being), their objectives had
not been reached. This phrase signaled

a continuing commitment to the antiparty cause, and his apology left an
impression in the minds of the public,
who were not accustomed to hearing
political figures accept blame for their
failures (Parenti, 2005; Gott, 2001).
While the military coup tactics failed,
Chávez returned after his release from
prison to organize a coalition that
could oust the dominant parties in a
presidential electoral bid. As the Punto
Fijo regime faded, various smaller
parties came on board to form the Polo
Patriótico (Patriotic Pole), a coalition
for what had become the Movimiento
Quinta República or Movement for the
Fifth Republic (MVR). In 1998, Chávez
ran on the platform of writing a new
constitution and leading the nations of
South America in an original direction
that would unite and strengthen the
region (Gott, 2001). After the MVR
did well in local elections, COPEI and
AD desperately moved to endorse the
independent Salas Römer one week
before the election. It was not enough
to sway the election, and Chávez
won the presidency by a 56 to 39.9
percent margin (Hellinger, 2003). The
new constitution was drafted by a
constituent assembly and approved by a
referendum vote in 1999.
Politics and policy in the era of Chavismo
Using legitimate means to take power
has not guaranteed an easy time for
Chávez and his administration. The
opposition has been fierce since his first
election, marching en masse afterward to
demand both his ouster and a recall vote
on the basis that the election had been
rigged. Supporters have also turned out
to fill the streets, marching in defense of
Chávez’s legitimacy and celebrating the
anniversary of his inauguration. Both
opponents and supporters continue to
protest, voicing opinions about chavista
policies and programs. The stark split
between those who revere the president
and those who despise him makes for a
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polarized and volatile political climate
(Ellner & Hellinger, 2003; GarcíaGuadilla, 2003; Roberts, 2003).
Increased polarization can be seen
in political parties, labor groups and
civil organizations, but class divisions
are what most clearly distinguish
pro- from anti-governmental factions.
Chávez’s support comes predominantly
from the peasant and working classes.
According to a Datanalysis poll, in the
1998 presidential campaign Chávez
received the strongest support from
youth, men and lower classes (as cited
in Hellinger, 2003). In a subsequent
race against Francisco Arias Cárdenas,
the class distinction was again very clear,
with Arias receiving support from 2/3
of the wealthy and middle-class sectors,
Chávez from a majority of the poorest
social sectors (Hellinger, 2003). And as
noted, the reversal of the 2002 coup
was due in large part to the immediate
response of crowds from the poor
barrios (Hellinger, 2003).
As Chávez continues to pay particular
attention to the poor and to the
Indigenous and Black communities, his
approval ratings have grown immensely.
The 1999 constitution brought changes
by offering protection of land and
resources for Indigenous communities,
official status for Indigenous languages,
and the reservation of three deputy seats
in the National Assembly for Indigenous
representatives (Becker, 2004). In two
polls, Chávez’s support has grown to a
range of 53% to 70% and support for
the opposition has shrunk to a range of
10% to 27% (“And now your,” 2005).
Conversely, it is in the ranks of the
middle and upper classes that the most
opposition is found. The opposition
rallies and marches during the brief
2002 coup were organized in the more
affluent areas of eastern Caracas. The
coup itself showed where opposition
lay: it was supported by a faction of
military officers, business elites and the
privately-owned mass media (Cooper,
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2002; Hellinger, 2003). Pedro Carmona,
the man chosen as interim president
during the coup, had been the head
of Fedecámaras, the nation’s leading
business association. Even during the
anti-government oil strike/lockout of
2001, the majority of worker organizing
was done by unionized labor, which
is imbedded in the clientelist political
system; workers in the informal sectors
continued working (Hellinger, 2003).
A New York Times editorial affirms the
source of opposition, saying that Chávez’
opponents do not speak for the majority
of the population. Referencing his
victory in the 2004 recall referendum,
the editorial attributes Chávez’ victory
to the fact that his programs address
the concerns of the poor, who have
“felt like the neglected stepchildren of
the country’s oil boom” (“Hugo Chávez
wins,” 2004). The referendum had been
called for by opponents on the basis
of fraud, but after auditing the results
Chávez’s win was endorsed by both the
Organization of American States and the
U.S.-based Carter Center (Forero, 2004).
Domestic agenda in the new order:
The Missiónes
Despite the fierce opposition, the
administration has won seven national
referendums, succeeding in passing
a new constitution and initiating a
number of social programs. With the
stated goal of forming its own model
of “21st century socialism” or a “social,
humanist, egalitarian economy” (“Oil,
Missions,” 2005), the government’s
purpose with the projects is to give
more Venezuelans access to land,
education, health care and a means
of livelihood (Parenti, 2005; “Oil,
Missions,” 2005).
One of the first major projects was
“Plan Bolívar 2000,” a civil-military
public works project in which military
personnel worked to improve sanitation,
health, transportation, housing, and
other public infrastructures. It was both

a practical attempt to provide jobs and
services and a political attempt to show
the MVR party as a joint civil-military
organization (Buxton, 2003; Hellinger,
2003; Roberts, 2003). A series of other
projects, or missions as they are called,
have been initiated more recently,
addressing the foundations for social
welfare and a sustainable economy.
Two of the most successful missions
have been for health care and education.
Misión Barrio Adentro (Inner-City
Mission, roughly) has been providing
health care with the help of over 20,000
Cuban medics; it is reported to have
done over 185 million consultations
and saved over 25,000 lives (Munckton,
2005). The program has been criticized
by Venezuelans who fear the influence
of Cuban communism; others regard it
as nothing more than social work (“Oil,
missions,” 2005). Social work in the
realm of education is being provided
by Misión Ribas (Mission Robinson), a
program that offers free adult education.
It serves Venezuelans who haven’t
been able to attend high school due to
economic hardship; it offers stipends
to poor students and flexible hours for
those who are working. The program
graduated over 20,000 people in June,
and 210,000 people are expected to have
been graduated by the end of this year.
Most have already enrolled in Misión
Sucre, which provides people with free
university education (Munckton).
Other missions address issues of
food, land reform and housing. Food
sovereignty is the goal of Misión Mercal,
a project of state-run supermarkets.
Twenty five thousand Mercal stores
hold 60% of the food market and
source food from government-owned
cooperatives. This is a strategic move
toward food sovereignty for a country
that imports the vast majority of its
food (Munckton, 2005).
Likewise, land reform is a crucial
component of food sovereignty.
Government projects have been started
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to address rural land access issues,
which is urgent in a land where the
population is concentrated in urban
centers. The situation is precarious;
according to The Economist, 75% of
farmland is owned by less than 5% of
landowners (“And now your,” 2005).
The government claims that the country
cannot grow enough food to feed its
citizens, and its newly-created National
Lands Institute has begun a review of
latifundio, or large estates, for possible
redistribution (Bruce, Apr 29, 2005).
The government has asked hundreds
of firms to provide proof of title back
to 1848; failure to do so may result
in distribution of plots of land to
campesinos for small-scale agriculture
and farming cooperatives. At the time
of this publication only two estates have
had land expropriated, one of which
is a cattle ranch owned by the British
Vestey Group. Parts of the ranch have
been occupied by peasants for several
years. In March of this year, however,
the government declared failure of the
firm to provide adequate proof of title.
This clears the way for the government
to provide permanent titles to dozens of
families already living on the land under
provisional titles. The move is opposed
by ranchers, who have 60 days to legally

contest the government’s decision.
According to Bruce (Apr 29, 2005),
officials in charge of the reform say that
the goal is “effective but peaceful land
reform” (para. 23), which involves only
partial expropriation; the government
says that it would like for the ranchers
to continue using part of the land for
cattle ranching.
The Chávez administration is also
trying to address urban land issues.
The Housing Mission is giving titles to
poor Venezuelans who have been living
on plots for years, often in homes they
built themselves (“Venezuela to offer,”
2005; Munckton, 2005). Additionally,
the government is building low-cost
housing and providing subsidies and
credits to help pay for the homes.
Chávez has promised to build half a
million homes by next year, with hopes
of completely solving the housing crisis
in 17 years. He has admitted, however,
that so far they have fallen short of the
mark, saying that housing “is one of the
most serious [problems] that Venezuela
faces. Our revolution has provided some
answers but they’re really not enough”
(“Venezuela to offer,” 2005). In the last
five years, only 91,000 homes have
been built, not enough to house the 26
million who have inadequate housing.

Figure 2. Global crude oil prices over 2-year span (Source: U.S. Department of Energy)

Note: WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Brent are particular types of crude oil
that are used as references for quality (Elf, 2005).
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As part of the broader Project
PAIS (Poblaciones Agro-Industrialies
Sustentables, or Sustainable AgroIndustrial Populations), Chávez is
combining the missions with job
training and the formation of worker
cooperatives. The goal is to encourage
re-settlement of the countryside by
creating centers of development that
contain clinics, schools, and workshops
for the production of goods (“Oil,
missions,” 2005; Gott, 2001; Munckton,
2005; Parenti, 2005). The projects are
reported to have benefited 70% of the
population thus far (“Venezuela politics,”
2005; Munckton, 2005). However, all
of Chávez’s projects have been made
possible by unusually high international
oil prices, over $65US per barrel at the
time of this paper. (See Figure 2.) Time
will tell if the projects have succeeded in
“sowing” the oil money, or if they have
merely spent it. The future of Chávez’s
agenda remains uncertain.
Chávez’s programs may also appear
inadequate because poverty rates have
not decreased since reforms began.
The statistic from the Miami Herald
(as cited in Weisbrot, 2005) is often
quoted by opponents that the poverty
rate grew from 49% in 1998 to 53%
in 2004. The figures are correct, but
they do not necessarily depict what
is taking place in society as a whole.
Others counter that the poverty rate
had begun to decline in 2003, and
living standards for the lowest 84%
of the population have increased by
one third after accounting for inflation
(Datos Information Resources, as cited
in Munckton, 2005). According to
Weisbrot (2005), statistics on household
poverty do not include non-cash
income of the poor such as subsidized
food, health care and housing.
Furthermore, he says that these
kinds of subsidies have dramatically
improved quality of life for the majority
of Venezuelans. Because of this, he
argues, one must take into account the
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different kinds of changes in resource
distribution that are happening in
Venezuela in order to compare the
effectiveness of Chávez’s policies.
International agenda
The missións are attempting to improve
quality of life for Venezuelans on the
domestic front. As a direct result of
the missións, millions of Venezuelans
are receiving food and land, forming
worker cooperatives for production of
goods for the domestic market, and
have more access to a high school and
college-level education. But international
relations also play an important role in
Chávez’s Bolivarian vision. When he ran
for president, Chávez promised changes
that would protect the country from the
negative effects of globalization (Kelly
& Romero, 2002). A key part of his
plan to revive the nation is encouraging
cooperation among countries in South
America and the Caribbean, outside
of the influence of the United States.
Venezuela’s increasing involvement
in the Andean Community, OPEC,
and neighboring countries shows his
commitment to regional integration
and international trade, though moves
such as oil contracts with Cuba have
not been well-received by the U.S. Even
yet, Venezuela has remained a reliable
supplier of oil to the United States and is
still a major importer of U.S. goods.
Economic integration is just one part of
the plan to strengthen the region; cultural
and political coordination form the other.
This summer the government (along
with Argentina, Uruguay, and Cuba)
launched a new Latin American television
network, Telesur, which is meant to
provide a venue for media from a Latin
American perspective. Andres Izarra,
Telesur’s president, describes the project
as “an initiative to integrate through
communication the different countries of
the region [and] an essential pre-requisite
for closer political and economic links
across Latin America” (Bruce, Jun 28,
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2005, para. 16). Chávez has also used
the Organization of American States
and the United Nations as sounding
boards for building regional unity and for
defense of political actions. In an hopeful
statement in a March meeting between
Chávez and heads of state from Brazil,
Colombia, and Spain, Chávez said that “a
new geopolitical map is forming on the
horizon,” one “without confrontations”
(“Presidente Chávez,” 2005, para. 8).
Discussion
Class relations within Venezuelan society
It seems quite possible that a new
geopolitical map is on the horizon for
Latin America, though it is not likely to
be free of confrontations. As illustrated,
a fierce debate rages between supporters
and opponents of Chávez. Both sides
have claims that are legitimate; thus in
order to understand the situation it is
not enough to take a side, one must
understand what is at stake for those
on different sides of the debate. Also,
the struggle is taking place in both the
national and international arenas.
As discussed above, most of Chávez’s
opponents are of privileged social status
and class. As a result, their privilege is
at risk with the success of the MVR’s
policies. The Punto Fijo government,
while far more democratic than the
dictators and military regimes that
preceded it, was a system that remained
by and for the wealthy. The reason that
Chávez was able to gain power and
that his revolutionary programs have
been relatively well-received is that the
majority of the population was and
is seeking radical change (Hellinger,
2003). Coronil’s observation (1997,
2000) that the system appeared, but
was not fully inclusive is important.
Political power has consistently been
reserved for the upper class status and
people of European descent – never
for Indigenous or mixed ethnicity, until
Chávez (Becker, 2004). What Chávez
did with his electoral bid was bring

class issues to the forefront of political
dialogue in Venezuela. Because the
traditional balance of power has been
unequal, the creation of a more inclusive
system will necessarily require the
political elite to sacrifice some privilege.
Land reform, proportional representation
and government-subsidized social
services are just a few examples of how a
better balance of power may be created.
If productive enterprises such as worker
cooperatives can be sustained, they
may also be the key to the country’s
sustainable non-oil economy.
Most Venezuelans were prosperous
during the oil boom of the 20th
century. The problem was that it was
not a sustainable prosperity nor was
it, as many had believed, the reward
for their exceptional self-governance.
With citizens content to rely on the
government for distribution of resources,
they were not required to be active
beyond participating in elections. This
poses a problem today as the country
tries to wean itself off of its reliance
on oil and spur productivity in other
areas. As the planning and development
minister, Jorge Giordani, told The Nation:
We’ve been fighting political battles
for most of our time in office. Many
people have learned to read in the
last few years, but how long will
it take for them to work in high
technology, or medicine, or services?
Three years? A generation? We are
fighting a very individualistic, rentier
culture. Everything has been ‘Mama
state, Papa state, give me oil money.’
To organize people is extremely
hard. (as cited in Parenti, 2005, p. 5)
This problem is not easily placed on
any one individual or institution, but
on a confluence of factors in Venezuela’s
history. The root causes of economic
decline were many, and as a result
solutions will necessarily take time.
Chávez seems to be trying to address
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this by requiring that communities
organize in order to receive aid from
the government. One attempt at this
organization is the proliferation of
“Bolivarian circles,” which are small,
civilian-led local groups formed to
broaden participation in and support
for the Bolivarian cause (Maya, 2003;
García-Guadilla, 2003; Parenti). In
order for there to be true and longlasting transformation, however, local
community organizing must continue
by Venezuelans of all political bents.
Education as well will play a key role, if
the educational missiónes are carried out
in a way that cultivates active and nonpartisan citizenship.
Changes in global dynamics of power
Because no nation exists in complete
isolation in today’s world, power
relationships must be transformed on
the global level as well. The relationship
between nations of first- and thirdworld status has historically been one
of inequality, and for all its wealth as
an oil-exporting nation, Venezuela
has not managed to escape this.
Extraction of resources by colonial
powers was followed by extraction
of resources by first-world consumer
markets, and finally loans that required
radical structural adjustments ravaged
the fragile society. For economic
development to benefit everyone in
South American nations, serious strides
must be made to give the poor access
to institutions of power and democratic
decision-making. How Venezuela is
represented in international forums,
institutions, and in mass media will
do much to determine the role the
country will have in determining its
development agenda.
Though it is often portrayed as such,
chavismo cannot be easily dismissed
as anti-globalization, anti-capitalist or
even anti-American. Kelly and Romero
(2002) cite regional integration in
the form of the Andean Community
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and Mercosur as an “alternative to
globalization” (p. 39). This is only
accurate if globalization is defined
narrowly, as what has been dubbed
the “Washington Consensus” or the
model of U.S.-led neoliberal capitalism.
Globalization should not be limited
to the design of first-world schools
of thought, however. Chávez has said
that his project is “neither statist nor
neo-liberal,” that they are “exploring
the middle ground, where the invisible
hand of the market joins up with the
visible hand of the state: as much state
as necessary, and as much market as
possible” (Gott, 2001, p. 172). It is
clear both by the government’s efforts
to strengthen ties with neighboring
nations and its enthusiastic involvement
with international trade that it is not
opposed to globalization. It cannot be
anti-capitalist either, as evidenced by
the way that Chávez has maintained
constitutional protection for capitalist
elements such as private property rights
and foreign collaboration with the state
oil industry.
What seems more likely is that
Chávez is seeking a model of
involvement in the global economy
that puts Venezuela first – a model that
will raise the standard of living for the
poor and empower the country and
region, rather than continue the failed
neoliberal model that was destructive
in its implementation. It should come
as no surprise that most Venezuelans
have rejected the orthodox economic
model championed by the United States,
because it did not benefit them.
Once this distinction is made,
it becomes easier to understand
Chávez’s harsh treatment of the U.S.
in his rhetoric. His inflammatory antiAmericanism is often the focus of media
attention, as with his denunciation
of a U.S. memo to the nations of
CARICOM in June. The memo asked
CARICOM nations to encourage Chávez
to respect democratic institutions,

accusing his government of using oil
money to “destabilize its democratic
neighbors” while “financing extremist
and antidemocratic groups” in the
region (“EEUU envió informes,” 2005).
Chávez was quick to rebuke the United
States, defending his commitment to
democracy. Citing the history of U.S.
intervention in the region, he called
the memorandum “a slap in the face”
(“EEUU envió informes”).
Despite this tension, Chávez has
not completely rejected nor attacked
the historical ally of his country. He
is critical of U.S. intervention, as he
is seeking ways for nations in the
region to resolve their own conflicts
and determine their own style of
involvement in global affairs. Given
that there is a well-documented history
of U.S. involvement in Latin American
affairs, including the coup attempt on
Chávez in 2002, his wariness is perhaps
justified. Relations were not helped by
the recent television broadcast of U.S.
Reverend Pat Robertson, who called for
the assassination of Chávez on the basis
that he had “destroyed the Venezuelan
economy” and will make the continent
“a launching pad for communist
infiltration and Muslim extremism”
(Borger & Campbell, 2005, p. 1). But
the condemnations of these statements
already voiced by citizens of the United
States will hopefully serve to ameliorate
the situation.
Certainly problems exist with
Chávez’s authoritarian tendencies;
for the sake of limiting the scope of
this paper, I have not attempted to
elaborate on his reported disrespect for
the civil rights of his opponents and
members of the private media. What
I do assert is that we must be careful
not to think that the scenario is simply
one of democracy versus dictatorship,
because this is misleading; it obscures
the problem of poverty and political
exclusion that was the impetus for the
changes Chávez promises.
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The extent of the “Revolution”
The pressure that South American
countries face to modernize by the same
model as the United States and Western
Europe has created a clash of cultures
that has yet to be reconciled because
as of yet no one side has prevailed.
This seems to be the question posed
by Venezuela’s “revolution.” Chávez’s
policies for economics, international
relations, and development have serious
implications both for Venezuelans
and for how the world conceives
of development. They have similar
implications for how the U.S. conceives
of its role in the hemisphere as a
leader and mediator. In the interest
of sustainability and more egalitarian

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 9, 2005

models, people who have been held
in third-world status will need to have
more leadership roles in development.
Venezuela today is pioneering a model
of economic development that breaks
with the past orthodox models of
statism and capitalism. Those who
live in the “first-world” would do
well to glean fresh insights from the
experiments of communities to the
South. Not only are they sure to impact
the future of global economic relations,
but their experiments may provide
helpful models for even the most
successful nations, as all countries will
face rapid change and uncertainty in the
globalizing world.
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